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00-730 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Mineta
Ruling Below (A darand Caomiton, In v Slater, 10' Cir., 228 F.3d 1147, 69 U.S.L.W. 1204):
Subcontracting compensation clause in federal highway procurement contracts, which
provides financial bonus to prime contractor for subcontracting with disadvantaged business
enterprises, is narrowly tailored to further government's compelling interest in remedying
racial discrimination in government contracting markets and thus does not violate Fifth
Amendment's equal protection clause.
Question Presented: May strict scrutiny be applied differently to Congress then to other
governmental actors?
ADARAND CONSTRUCTORS, INC., Appellee
V.
Rodney E. SLATER, et al., Appellants
United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit
Decided Sept. 25, 2000.
LUCERO, Circuit Judge
Following the Supreme Court's vacation
of our dismissal on mootness grounds,
we address the merits of this appeal,
namely, the federal government's
challenge to the district court's grant of
summary judgment to plaintiff-appellee
Adarand Constrictors, Inc. In so doing,
we must resolve the constitutionality of
the use in federal subcontracting
procurement of the Subcontractor
Compensation Clause ("SCC'), which
employs race-conscious presumptions
designed to favor minority enterprises
and other "disadvantaged business
enterprises" ("DBEs"). Our evaluation
of the SCC program utilizes the "strict
scrutiny' standard of constitutional
review enunciated by the Supreme Court
in an earlier decision in this case,
Adarand Comtarors, In v Pem, 515 U.S.
200, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 132
(1995) ("Adarand III").
L.Ed.2d 158
In his concurring opinion in A daran iII,
Justice Scalia succinctly articulated this
Nation's guiding aspiration: "In the eyes
of government, we are just one race here.
It is American." Id at 239, 115 S.Ct.
2097 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). Until that
future day when national aspiration and
national reality converge, the Court has
made clear that under certain
circumstances the federal government
may use race-conscious means to remedy
the effects of historical and present-day
racial discrimination. Thus, exercising
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C 5 1291,
we reverse the judgment of the district
court below.
1
II
We begin by addressing the scope of our
inquiry in this appeal. It is essential that
we decide which versions of the statutes
and regulations at issue are properly
before us, as well as which portions of
those statutes and regulations are
relevant to this appeal.
* * The changes in the law are squarely
before us today, and we discern no
reason to leave their scrutiny to future
litigation, in effect prolonging the instant
litigation and fostering "both a wasteful
expenditure of resources by courts and
litigating parties and the gradual
undermining of public confidence in the
judiciary--in short, Dickens's Jarndye v
Jamdye syndrome." McJlramy v Kerr-McGee
Cal C'p., 204 F.3d 1031, 1035 (10th
Cir.2000).
However, considering that we are
reviewing a decision of the district court
below that relied on older versions of the
statutes, regulations, and SCC, and
because we are mindful that future
statutory and regulatory changes may
cause the government to "engage in (or
resume) [the] harmful conduct" in
question earlier in this litigation so as to
militate against a finding of mootness,
A darand VI, 528 U.S. at ---- , 120 S.Ct. at
726 (quoting Finds jfthe Eanh, 528 U.S.
at ----, 120 S.Ct. at 699), we consider the
statutory and regulatory framework in its
prior stages as well. " * *
III
In reviewing the district court's grant of
summary judgment to Adarand, we
employ our customary standard of
review.
We review a grant of a motion for
summary judgment de novo, applying
the same legal standard used by the
district court. Sw Bps u City <j
Albuquerque, 150 F.3d 1271, 1274 (10th
Cir.1998). Summary judgment is
appropriate "if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law."
Fed.RCiv.P. 56(c). We view the
evidence, and all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom, in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. See
Bps, 150 F.3d at 1274.
McGay u Bad of Camty Grrn'n, 175
F.3d 1193, 1198 (10th Cir.1999). At the
very outset, before immersing ourselves
in the intricacies of the issues before us,
we emphasize our substantial agreement
with much of the district court's
judgment as it pertains to the versions of
the statutes and regulations in place in
1996. Insofar as the court's judgment
does not exceed the proper scope of its
review and with the significant caveat
that we disagree both with the court's
conclusion regarding the fatality in fact
of strict scrutiny and with its ultimate
result in light of the current version of
the relevant regulations, we take the
district court's view of the matter. And
we share wholeheartedly its sentiment
that the time has come for this litigation
to come to an end. S&- A darand IV, 965
F.Supp. at 1558.
A. Evolution of Strict Scrutiny
Standards
The Supreme Court's declarations in
the affirmative action area are
characterized by plurality and split
opinions and by the overruling of
2
precedent. This fractured prism
complicates the task of lower courts in
both identifying and applying an
appropriate form of equal protection
review. * *
* * *Now, informed by the Supreme
Court's directives pertaining to remand,
and its multifaceted jurisprudence on
affirmative action programs, we turn to
the task of assessing the application of
racial presumptions in the SCC
program under a strict scrutiny
standard.
B. Compelling Interest
We "decide the question [of] whether the
interests served by the use of [SCCs] are
properly described as 'compelling.' "
Adarand III, 515 U.S. at 237, 115 S.Ct.
2097. In so doing, our inquiry necessarily
consists of four parts: First, we must
determine whether the government's
articulated goal in enacting the race-
based measures at issue in this case is
appropriately considered a "compelling
interest" under the governing case law, if
so, we must then set forth the standards
under which to evaluate the
government's evidence of compelling
interest; third, we must decide whether
the evidence presented by the
goverment is sufficiently strong to meet
its initial burden of demonstrating the
compelling interest it has articulated; and
finally, we must examine whether the
challenging party has met its ultimate
burden of rebutting the government's
evidence such that the granting of
summary judgment to either party is
proper. We begin, as we must, with an
inquiry into the meaning of "compelling
interest."
1. "Compelling Interest" in Race-
Conscious Measures Defined
We know from Adarard III that, as a
general proposition, there may be a
compelling interest that supports the
enactment of race-conscious measures.
Justice O'Connor explicitly states: "The
unhappy persistence of both the practice
and the lingering effects of racial
discrimination against minority groups in
this country is an unfortunate reality, and
government is not disqualified from
acting in response to it." A darand III, 515
U.S. at 237, 115 S.Ct. 2097; se also Shaw
v Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 909, 116 S.Ct.
1894, 135 L.Ed.2d 207 (1996) (stating
that "remedying the effects of past or
present racial discrimination may in the
proper case justify a government's use of
racial distinctions" (citing Cram 488
U.S. at 498-506, 109 S.Ct. 706)).
***
2. Evidence Required
Compelling Interest
to Show
While the government's articulated
interest is compelling as a theoretical
matter, we must yet determine whether
the actual evidence proffered by the
government supports the existence of
past and present discrimination in the
publicly-funded highway construction
subcontracting market. * * *
Our "benchmark for judging the
adequacy of the govenmment's factual
predicate for affirmative action
legislation [i]s whether there exists a
'str basis in ede xe for [the
government's] conclusion that remedial
action was necessary.' Corate Woks, 36
F.3d at 1521 (quoting Cwmon, 488 U.S. at
500, 109 S.Cr. 706 (quoting Wgzan 476
3
U.S. at 277, 106 S.Ct. 1842 (plurality)))
(emphasis in Cmte Wos ). Both
statistical and anecdotal evidence are
appropriate in the strict scrutiny calculus,
although anecdotal evidence by itself is
not. Sw vmvre Woks, 36 F.3d at 1520-
21.
* * * After the government's initial
showing, the burden shifts to Adarand to
rebut that showing: "Notwithstanding
the burden of initial production that
rests" with the government, "[t]he
ultimate burden [of proof] remains with
[the challenging party] to demonstrate
the unconstitutionality of an affirmative-
action program." Id (quoting Wgmt
476 U.S. at 277-78, 106 S.Ct. 1842
(plurality)). ** *
In addressing the question of what
evidence of discrimination supports a
compelling interest in providing a
remedy, we consider both direct and
circumstantial evidence, including post-
enactment evidence introduced by
defendants as well as the evidence in the
legislative history itself. See Gmnte
Woks, 36 F.3d at 1521, 1529 n. 23
(considering post-enactment evidence).
Furthermore, we may consider public
and private discrimination not only in
the specific area of government
procurement contracts but also in the
construction industry generally, thus, any
findings Congress has made as to the
entire construction industry are relevant.
Se ii at 1523, 1529; see also Cson 488
U.S. at 492, 109 S.Ct. 706 (Op. of
O'Connor, J.).
***
3. Evidence in the Present Case
There can be no doubt that Congress
repeatedly has considered the issue of
discrimination in government
construction procurement contracts,
finding that racial discrimination and its
continuing effects have distorted the
market for public contracts--especially
construction contracts--necessitating a
race- conscious remedy. * * *
Of course, statements made with regard
to discrimination in the subcontracting
industry by congressional reports and by
members of Congress are insufficient in
themselves to support a finding of
compelling interest. * * * The question
that CrOson requires us to ask is whether
there is a strong basis in evidence to
support the legislature's conclusion.
* * * [The evidence presented by the
government in the present case
demonstrates the existence of two kinds
of discriminatory barriers to minority
subcontracting enterprises, both of
which show a strong link between racial
disparities in the federal government's
disbursements of public funds for
construction contracts and the
channeling of those funds due to private
discrimination. The first discriminatory
barriers are to the formation of qualified
minority subcontracting enterprises due
to private discrimination, precluding
from the outset competition for public
construction contracts by minority
enterprises. The second discriminatory
barriers are to fair competition between
minority and non-minority
subcontracting enterprises, again due to
private discrimination, precluding
existing minority firms from effectively
competing for public construction
contracts. The government also presents
further evidence in the form of local
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disparity studies of minority
subcontracting and studies of local
subcontracting markets after the removal
of affirmative action programs. * * *
* * *
C. Narrow Tailoring
** *
4. Adarand's Rebuttal
Adarand and the amici curiae supporting
it have utterly failed to meet their
"ultimate burden" of introducing
credible, particularized evidence to rebut
the government's initial showing of the
existence of a compelling interest in
remedying the nationwide effects of past
and present discrimination in the federal
construction procurement
subcontracting market. " * * Its
assertions as to the general
impermissibility of a race-conscious
remedy regardless of the compelling
interest identified by Congress are not in
accordance with equal protection
jurisprudence. It is simply an untenable
interpretation of Equal Protection
Doctrine to insist that the Constitution
requires Congress to acquiesce in the
workings of an ostensibly free market
that would direct the profits to be
gleaned from disbursements of public
funds to non-minorities alone. See
Corxrete Wos, 36 F.3d at 1519 ("[The
Fourteenth Amendment permits race-
conscious programs that seek ... to
prevent the public entity from acting as a
"passive participant" in a system of
racial exclusion ...' by allowing tax dollars
'to finance the evil of private prejudice.' "
(quoting Crwon, 488 U.S. at 492, 109
S.Ct. 706)); se also Adarand III, 515 U.S.
at 237, 115 S.Ct. 2097 ("The unhappy
persistence of both the practice and the
lingering effects of racial discrimination
against minority groups in this country is
an unfortunate reality, and government is
not disqualified from acting in response
to it.").
We are guided in our inquiry by the
handful of Supreme Court cases that
have applied the narrow-tailoring
analysis to government affirmative action
programs. In applying strict scrutiny to a
court-ordered program remedying the
failure to promote black police officers, a
plurality of the Court stated that
[i]n determining whether race-
conscious remedies are
appropriate, we look to several
factors, including the necessity
for the relief and the efficacy of
alternative remedies; the
flexibility and duration of the
relief, including the availability of
waiver provisions; the
relationship of the numerical
goals to the relevant labor
market; and the impact of the
relief on the rights of third
parties.
Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171, 107 S.Ct. 1053
(1986) (plurality op. of Brennan, J.)
(citations omitted). Regarding flexibility,
"the availability of waiver" is of
particular importance. Id As for
numerical proportionality, Cson
admonishes us to beware of the
"completely unrealistic assumption that
minorities will choose a particular trade
in lockstep proportion to their
representation in the local population."
488 U.S. at 507, 109 S.Ct. 706 (quoting
SIEe Metal WOdke', 478 U.S. at 494, 106
S.Ct. 3019 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part)). In that
context, a "rigid numerical quota"
particularly disserves the cause of narrow
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tailoring. Id at 508, 109 S.Ct. 706.
Finally, as for burdens imposed on third
parties, a plurality of the Court in Wgat
stated:
As part of this Nation's
dedication to eradicating racial
discrimination, innocent persons
may be called upon to bear some
of the burden of the remedy.
"When effectuating a limited and
properly tailored remedy to cure
the effects of prior
discrimination, such a 'sharing of
the burden' by innocent parties is
not impermissible."
476 U.S. at 280-81, 106 S.Ct. 1842 (Op.
of Powell, J.) (quoting Fullilou, 448 U.S.
at 484, 100 S.Ct. 2758 (plurality)) (further
quotations and footnote omitted). We
are guided by that benchmark.
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in
Crson adds a further factor to our
analysis: under- or over-inclusiveness of
the DBE classification. * * *
More specific guidance is found in
A darand II. * * *We thus direct our
attention to an analysis of the program in
light of A darand II's specific questions
on remand, and the foregoing narrow-
tailoring factors, in the following order
(1) the availability of race-neutral
alternative remedies; (2) limits on the
duration of the SCC and DBE
certification programs; (3) flexibility; (4)
numerical proportionality; (5) the burden
on third parties; and (6) over- or under-
inclusiveness.
2. Race-neutral Alternative Remedies
The first factor to be considered is that
of the availability of alternative remedies
to the race-conscious measures at issue.
The district court in Adarand IV found,
and Adarand does not challenge its
finding, that Congress over a period of
decades attempted to correct by race-
neutral means the problem of too few
minority subcontractors for government
construction contracts, and only after it
continued to find discriminatory effects
did it first implement a race-conscious
remedy. See Adarand IV, 965 F.Supp. at
1582-83; see aso Crason 488 U.S. at 507,
109 S.Ct. 706 (noting the finding in
Fullifow that "Congress ... carefully
examined and rejected race-neutral
alternatives before enacting the MBE
set-aside"). * * * The long history of
discrimination in, and affecting, the
public construction procurement
market--despite the efforts dating back at
least to the enactment in 1958 of the
SBA to employ race-neutral measures--
places a formidable burden on both
existing and would-be minority
participants and thus justifies race-
conscious action to address a decidedly
racial disparity.
* * * The record before us does not
indicate whether or not FLHP
considered race-neutral measures prior
to resorting to the SCC. This absence
weighs strongly against any finding of
narrow tailoring. See A darand I, 515
U.S. at 237-38, 115 S.Ct. 2097; Cnrsm
488 U.S. at 507, 109 S.Ct. 706. The
district court was therefore correct, given
the information before it at the time, that
the SCC program was not narrowly
tailored, and should the govenment
reinstitute the revised program without
considering race-neutral measures similar
to those outlined in 49 CF.R. § 25.51(a)
and (b) (2000), that program too would
be insufficiently narrowly tailored.
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3. Appropriate Limit on Duration
A second important factor in any
narrow-tailoring analysis is a limit on the
duration of the race-conscious measures
at issue. ** *.
* * * The current § 8(d) program
regulations specifically incorporate the
certification requirements from the Small
Business Administration regulations
implementing the § 8(a) program. S& 48
CF.R § 19.001 (2000) (incorporating
certification requirements of 13 CF.R.
pt. 124, subpt. B); 13 CF.R 5
124.1002(a) (2000) (incorporating § 8(a)
criteria from 13 CF.R. pt. 124, subpt. A).
The regulations incorporated into the S
8(d) program provide for a certification
of a business as socially and
economically disadvantaged for three
years after either the initial certification
or other administrative determination.
See 13 CF.R § 124.1014 (2000). If a
business wishes to remain certified for
longer than three years, it must "submit a
new application and receive a new
certification." Id § 124.1014(c).
Therefore, with regard to appropriate
limitations on duration, the current DBE
certification programs are narrowly
tailored.
4. Additional Narrow-Tailoring Factors
a. Flexibility
The 1996 SCC program, providing a
subsidy for the use of DBEs, is certainly
more flexible than the set-asides
considered in either Fullilow or COson
because the program is not mandatory. *
* * Moreover, the 1996 SCC program
incorporates an additional element of
flexibility--"the availability of waiver,"
Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171, 107 S.Ct. 1053--
because any prime contractor is free not
to take advantage of the clause and will
never be required to make a "gratuitous"
choice of subcontractors, id at 178, 107
S.Ct. 1053. With regard to flexibility, the
1996 program passes muster under a
narrow-tailoring analysis.
F* **
b. Numerical Proportionality
Apart from the reasonableness of the
goals, the record before us supports the
government's contention that the 5%
and 10% goals incorporated in the
statutes at issue here, unlike the set-
asides in both Fullilow and Cnrcns are
merely aspirational and not mandatory.
* * * Therefore, while the goal may well
be relevant to the numerical
proportionality aspect of the Paradise
strict scrutiny inquiry, we disagree with
the district court that the goal itself is
facially unconstitutional. * * * Therefore,
we conclude both that Adarand is
without standing to mount any
independent challenge to the 5% and
10% figures and that such a challenge is
outside the scope of the Supreme
Court's A darand III remand. * * *
In sum, in conformity with the
aspirational nature of the percentage
goals of the relevant statutes, the current
regulations emphasize that the 10%
figure is nothing more than "an
aspirational goal at the national level," 49
C.F.R. § 26.41(b) (2000), which "does
not authorize or require recipients to set
overall or contract goals at the 10
7
percent level, or any other particular
level," id § 26.41(c). Thus, in practice
there are significant requirements
currently in place that must be met by
any recipient of federal highway
construction funds before setting even
an aspirational goal for DBE
participation. There is little danger of
arbitrariness in the setting of such goals,
as was the case in Cton, 488 U.S. at 507,
109 S.Ct. 706.
c. Burden on Third Parties
As for the third Paracise factor, the
burden on third parties is obviously
significant enough to grant standing to
Adarand. See A darand III, 515 US. at
211-12, 115 S.Ct. 2097. While there
appears to be no serious burden on
prime contractors, who are obviously
compensated for any additional burden
occasioned by the employment of DBE
subcontractors, at the margin, some non-
DBE subcontractors such as Adarand
will be deprived of business
opportunities. * * *
Moreover, the current regulations are
designed to increase the participation of
non-minority DBEs. As to those not
falling into one of the categories to
which a presumption of social
disadvantage applies, the current
regulations retain procedures for non-
minorities to participate in the DBE
program. * *
While at the margin, some DBEs may be
hired under the program in lieu of non-
DBEs, the possibility that innocent
parties will share the burden of a
remedial program is itself insufficient to
warrant the conclusion that the program
is not narrowly tailored. To invalidate the
1996 and revised SCC and other
government DBE programs on that
basis would be to render strict scrutiny
effectively fatal, in contravention of
Justice O'Connor's clear statements to
the contrary. Se A darand III, 515 U.S. at
237, 115 S.Ct. 2097.
d. Over- or Under-Inclusiveness
The last factor we must consider in
applying strict scrutiny in this case is that
of the over- or under-inclusiveness of
the programs at issue. * * *
Even if a race-conscious namr of
achieving the goal of increasing minority
participation is necessary, in
promulgating the SCC in use at the time
of the district court's decision in A darand
IV, defendants-appellants have not
demonstrated that they considered the
effectiveness of at least one other, less
sweeping approach to implementing a
race-conscious SCC program
disaggregating the presumptions of social
and economic disadvantage, as is the
case under the SBA § 8(a) program, to
require a separate determination of social
disadvantage and economic
disadvantage. See 48 C.F.R. § 52.219-8
(1996). * **
* * *While the concept of classifying
human beings by race is distasteful, the
fact remains that discrimination occurs
based on such classifications, and
engaging the classifications in order to
eradicate such discrimination is a
necessary evil which constitutes a
compelling govenment interest.
We agree in principle that the 1996 SCC
program would be more narrowly
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tailored had the CFLHD conducted an
inquiry into the scope of discrimination
within the region it administers as the
current regulations mandate. * * *
However, the district court's ensuing
conclusion appears to stem from a
premise that a classification, to be
narrowly tailored, must not only include
minority individuals who have
themselves suffered discrimination, but
must also automatically include all non-
minority individuals who have suffered
disadvantage as well. ***
Although we disagree with the district
court's effectively fatal standard of
scrutiny, we again note that comparison
with the current SBA § 8(d) and TEA-21
regulations illustrates how the more
careful tailoring now in place avoids
some of the problems identified by the
district court--again, the court's
conclusion that the "Sultan of Brunei,"
should he have the temerity to apply,
could qualify for DBE status. Adarand
IV, 965 F.Supp. at 1581 n. 17. * * The
current regulations more precisely
identify the proper minority recipients of
DBE certification by periodically re-
screening for economic disadvantage all
candidates for such certification. Se 13
C.F.R. § 124.1014 (2000).
Mindful of the Supreme Court's mandate
to exercise particular care in examining
governmental racial classifications, we
conclude that the 1996 SCC was
insufficiently narrowly tailored as applied
in this case and is thus unconstitutional
under A darand III 's strict standard of
scrutiny. Nonetheless, after examining
the current SCC and DBE certification
programs, we conclude that the 1996
defects have been remedied, and the
relevant programs now meet the
requirements of narrow tailoring.
V
The judgment of the district court is
REVERSED. This matter is remanded
for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
APPENDIX(Deleted)
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Justices Agree to Hear Colo. Affirmative-Action Case
The Denver Post
Tuesday, March 27, 2001
Bill McAllister
U.S. Supreme Court agreed Monday to
rehear a Colorado case that questions
how far government can go in pressing
affirmative action through its
contracting.
In 1995, Colorado Springs-based
Adarand Constructors won a major high
court decision that limited government-
run affirmative action programs. That
victory, however, was cut short this past
September when a three-judge panel of
the 10th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld revisions that the Clinton
administration made to the program.
The changes were designed to ensure
only firms owned by individuals "who
are truly socially and economically
disadvantaged" can benefit from
affirmative action, the Justice
Department maintained.
But Randy Pech, Adarand president, said
there wasn't any significant difference
between the new rules and the initial
program that the Supreme Court rejected
six years ago when he first filed a
complaint against a U.S. Transportation
Department highway-construction
program.
He greeted Monday's news with relief.
"I'm very satisfied," said the operator of
the 47-employee firm, which has been
battling affirmative action rules for more
than a decade.
With the help of the Denver-based
Mountain States Legal Foundation, Pech
complained to the high court that the
new rules effectively "compel race
discrimination" in violation of the
Constitution's equal protection of the
laws guarantee.
Monday the justices agreed, without
comment, to reopen the case.
Arguments in the dispute probably will
not be heard until the fall, Mountain
States said.
Adarand had sued over a Transportation
Department program that gave bonuses
to highway contractors if at least 10
percent of their subcontracts went to
"disadvantaged business enterprises." It
was presumed companies owned by
ethnic minorities were disadvantaged.
Some justices said in the 1995 ruling that
the government had illegally
discriminated against Pech, who is white,
in the process of trying to help
mnonties.
Justice Department lawyers had urged
the court not to hear the case, arguing
that the Clinton rules met the
requirements of the court's 1995 ruling.
In Denver, William Perry Pendley,
president of Mountain States Legal
Foundation and Adarand's lawyer since
1989, welcomed the court's decision.
"We are extremely gratified that the
Supreme Court has agreed to issue one
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final ruling in this very important case,"
he said in a statement.
Pendley noted this will be the third time
the case has gone before the high court.
Last year, the foundation had to go back
to the court to get Adarand's complaint
about the Clinton program reinstated
after a lower-court judge dismissed it as
moot.
Pech expressed hope that the Bush
administration would "be more open" to
his complaint.
In its petition to the Supreme Court,
Mountain States argued that despite
being the lowest bidder, Adarand failed
to win a highway guard rail construction
contract near West Dolores in 1989
because the government's rules gave 'an
irresistible $10,000 bonus' to the prime
highway contractor if it gave the work to
Gonzales Construction Co.
Unlike Adarand, Gonzales was
designated a "disadvantaged business
enterprise" because it was owned by a
minority presumed under federal law to
be "socially and economically
disadvantaged."
"There is no dispute, therefore, that
Congress and the U.S. Department of
Transportation treated Gonzalez
differently than they treated Adarand and
did so solely on the basis of the race of
their owners," the Mountain States brief
said.
Pech said his firm is so small, there was
"no way" he could have mounted the
court challenge without the support of
the Mountain States Legal Foundation.
Copyright © 2001 The Denver Post
Corporation.
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Skeptical Justices Await Affirmative Action Case;
Policy's Future is Uncertain Since Conservative Majority on the
Supreme Court Has Rejected Similar Racial Set-Asides Before
Los Angeles Times
Tuesday, March 27, 2001
David G. Savage
The Supreme Court cast new doubt
Monday on the future of affirmative
action by the government, as it agreed to
hear a white contractor's challenge to
federal programs that give an edge to
minority-owned businesses.
The case, to be heard in the fall, tests
whether race can ever be used as a plus
factor for awarding government contracts
to such firms.
It also puts the Bush administration on
the spot. While conservatives have
opposed minority-preference programs,
the government's lawyers are generally
obliged to defend federal programs.
Federal transportation law says that "not
less than 10%" of the highway and transit
funds should go to "disadvantaged
business enterprises." The law presumes
businesses headed by "black Americans,
Hispanic Americans, Native Americans,
Asian Pacific Americans and other
minorities" are socially and economically
disadvantaged. The 10% set-aside would
amount to about $17 billion a year.
But this minority-preference program, and
others like it, have a powerful foe in the
Supreme Court.
Six years ago, the court's conservative
majority said the U.S. Constitution forbids
racial discrimination against whites as well
as blacks. "We hold today that all racial
classifications, imposed by whatever
federal, state or local government actor,"
are constitutionally suspect, the 5-4
majority wrote.
At that time, the court did not strike down
the federal set-aside programs in the case
of Adarand Constructors vs. Pena. Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor's opinion suggested
their days were numbered, however.
These "affirmative" preferences for racial
minorities are unconstitutional, she said,
except when they are directed narrowly to
make up for actual instances of
discrimination against minorities.
The ruling was met with a mixed reaction.
Conservatives said the Adarand decision
meant the end for these "set-aside"
programs. The Clinton administration's
lawyers instead adopted the Rev. Jesse
Jackson's plea: "Mend it. Don't end it."
The administration moved to eliminate
the wealthy from the "disadvantaged
business" program, dropping minority
business owners with a net worth of more
than $750,000. And whites were told they
could qualify as "disadvantaged" if they
could show they had suffered various
hardships.
The minority-preference program was still
needed to counter continuing racial bias in
the construction industry, Clinton
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administration lawyers said. The "old-boy
network" effectively excludes minorities
and women, they said.
In 1998, when the highway funding law
came before the Senate, the conservatives,
including then-Sen. John Ashcroft (R-
Mo.), moved to kill the set-aside program.
"I find this objectionable as a matter of
public policy," Ashcroft said on the
Senate floor. "The notion that every small
business owned by racial minorities is
somehow economically disadvantaged is
nonsense. It flies in the face of reality and
... is un-American to me," he said.
Beyond that, the "Adarand decision makes
plain the unconstitutionality of [these] set-
asides."
The amendment co-sponsored by
Ashcroft went down to defeat on a 58-37
vote. And in September of last year,
President Clinton celebrated when the
U.S. 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in
Denver ruled the government "may use
race-conscious means" to make up for
past discrimination.
But the white contractors in the original
Colorado case appealed to the Supreme
Court. And on Monday, the high court
announced it will hear a second challenge
to the same program (Adarand
Constructors vs. Mineta, 00-730).
This time, the defense of the program will
be led by the Bush administration's Justice
Department, headed by Atty. Gen.
Ashcroft.
In his confirmation hearing, Ashcroft was
asked about the new Adarand case. "It
would be inappropriate for me to
comment on pending litigation," he said,
but added that "it is long-standing policy
of the Justice Department to defend any
federal law for which a reasonable and
conscientious defense can be made."
The administration's lawyers have several
months to prepare a response. "Where
this leaves us is, we have to figure out
what our next move is," a department
official said.
The Clinton administration's solicitor
general, Seth Waxman, filed a brief
defending the set-aside program on Jan.
19, his last day in office. He argued that
the program was now targeted at truly
disadvantaged businesses, and it merely
set goals, not quotas.
The lawyer for the white contractor
disagrees. "Nothing has changed since
1990," said William Perry Pendley of the
Mountain States Legal Foundation in
Denver, which has represented Randy
Pech, Adarand's owner.
In his original complaint, Pech said he
submitted the low bid to erect guardrails
on a stretch of federal highway but lost
the contract to the Gonzales Construction
Co. Under an earlier version of the federal
program, the government offered a cash
bonus of $10,000 to the prime contractor
for hiring Gonzales, a minority-owned
firm.
Although the bonus program has been
abolished, the state and regional agencies
that distribute highway funds must
continue to meet the goals written into
law.
"In this region, they have to meet a goal
of 15% to 18% per year. So the agency
makes sure that a certain percentage of
the work goes to these ' disadvantaged'
businesses," Pendley said.
The outcome of the case probably
depends on O'Connor.
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The four most conservative members of
the court oppose any use of race-based
affirmative action. They are Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist and Justices
Antonin Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy and
Clarence Thomas. O'Connor has voted
regularly with them, but she also has left
the door open to a limited use of
affirmative action to deal with continuing
discrimination.
In the next few years, the court is also
likely to take up a new challenge to
affirmative action in college admissions.
Several cases are pending in the lower
courts.
Meanwhile, the court agreed to take up a
follow-up case to last week's ruling on
arbitration.
On a 5-4 vote, the justices ruled that
employees who sign arbitration
agreements cannot take their bias claims
to court. Now, the court will consider
whether the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission can sue on
behalf of workers. The case of EEOC vs.
Waffle House, 99-1823, will be heard in
the fall.
Copyright D 2001 The Times Mirror
Company
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Justices to Revisit Affirmative Action in a Test Case for Bush
The New Yok Times
Tuesday, March 27, 2001, Late Edition
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court set the stage today
for a renewed debate over affirmative
action, accepting a constitutional
challenge to a federal contracting law
that presumes that companies owned by
blacks and members of other minorities
are eligible for special treatment as
"socially and economically
disadvantaged" enterprises.
The case, to be argued in the fall but with
briefs due by late spring, will provide the
first test of the Bush administration's
willingness to defend current federal
policies on highly charged subjects like
race.
As a senator from Missouri in 1998,
Attorney General John Ashcroft voted
against reauthorizing the disadvantaged
business enterprise program at the
Department of Transportation, the policy
under attack in the case the court accepted
today. Asked this month on the NBC
program "Meet the Press" whether he
would defend the policy before the court,
Mr. Ashcroft told the host, Tim Russert:
"I defend the law of America. Obviously,
I will defend the Department of
Transportation's regulations."
The plaintiff in the new case, Adarand
Constructors, is the same white-owned
contracting company in Colorado Springs
whose challenge to an earlier version of
the policy led in 1995 to a Supreme Court
decision that federal programs containing
racial preferences were constitutionally
suspect.
The court did not strike down the
program in the original Adarand case,
instead sending it back to the lower courts
to see whether it could survive the newly
articulated standard of "strict scrutiny." In
September, the United States Court of
Appeals for the 10th Circuit, in Denver,
said the program met the test and was
constitutional.
The contracting program has evolved in
the intervening six years and, according to
a brief the Clinton administration filed
with the Supreme Court on Bill Clinton's
last full day in office, "differs
substantially" from the one the court
found constitutionally dubious in 1995.
Whether those changes -- which prohibit
the use of quotas or set-asides and make
the presumption of economic
disadvantage easier for competitors to
challenge -- create a constitutional
difference is a central question in the new
case.
Another question is how far-reaching an
examination of affirmative action the
court intends to make with this case as its
vehicle. On one level, the new appeal,
Adarand Constructors Inc. v. Mineta, No.
00-730, is little more than a factual dispute
about whether the disadvantaged business
enterpnse program was sufficiently
"narrowly tailored" to the compelling
governmental interest in easing barriers
faced by minority-owned companies in
public contracting.
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On this basis, the Clinton administration
labored to persuade the justices to pass on
the case. "The allegation that a court of
appeals has misapplied settled law to the
particular facts of a case is not the sort of
matter that ordinarily warrants this court's
review," Seth P. Waxman, then the
solicitor general, told the court in a brief
filed on Jan. 19.
The fact that the court still granted the
case suggests that at least some justices --
the votes of four are needed to accept a
case -- are after bigger game. There is a
suggestion in the appeal filed for Adarand
by the Mountain States Legal Foundation
that no federal affirmative action program
is constitutional unless it is intended to
redress discrimination practiced by the
government itself.
Some Supreme Court decisions have
suggested such a rule, but the court has
never actually gone so far. In opposing
review on that broader ground, the
Clinton administration's brief quoted from
a separate opinion by Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor in a 1989 affirmative action
case, City of Richmond v. Croson, in
which Justice O'Connor said: "It is
beyond dispute that any public entity,
state or federal, has a compelling interest
in assuring that public dollars, drawn from
the tax contributions of all citizens, do not
serve to finance the evil of private
prejudice."
Justice O'Connor's vote will be critical to
the outcome in the new case because she
is the court's swing justice on affirmative
action, as she demonstrated in the earlier
Adarand case. In that case, decided by a 5-
to-4 vote, she wrote for the court that the
minority contracting program was
constitutionally dubious but added that
"we wish to dispel the notion that strict
scrutiny is strict in theory but fatal in
fact."
Given the persistence of racial
discrimination, she said, "government is
not disqualified from acting in response to
it."
Whatever the court had in mind in
accepting the new case, the decision to do
so did not come easily. The justices
considered the case in their weekly closed-
door conference four times since late
January, an unusually long period of
review at this stage.
The Adarand dispute dates to 1989, when
despite being the lowest bidder on a
contract to install guardrails on a stretch
of Colorado highway, Adarand lost the
job to a minority-owned subcontractor.
Under the disadvantaged business
enterprise program as it then was, the
general contractor received a $10,000
bonus from the federal Department of
Transportation for using a subcontractor
that qualified under the program.
Adarand now argues that changes to the
program since then have not cured the
basic constitutional defect of
incorporating a racial classification into
federal law and regulations. The Mountain
States Legal Foundation, a conservative
law and policy group based in Denver,
which is representing Adarand, has close
ties to the Bush administration. Gale A-
Norton, secretary of the interior, worked
there as a lawyer.
In a second case today, the court followed
up on its ruling last week on arbitration in
the workplace by accepting an appeal by
the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission. That federal agency is
authorized to sue employers on behalf of
workers who claim they have been
discriminated against. The question in the
case, E.E.O.C v. Waffle House Inc., No.
99-1823, concerns what power the agency
retains to seek remedies on behalf of
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workers who are covered by binding
arbitration agreements.
Last week, in Circuit City v. Adams, the
court ruled that employers may enforce
agreements to take all workplace-related
disputes to arbitration, requiring workers
to waive their right to go to court. The
E.E.O.C. argues in the new case that it
should still be able to sue for relief like
back pay, reinstatement and damages on
behalf of workers who are covered by
arbitration agreements and who cannot
bring the suits themselves. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, in Richmond, Va., ruled in 1999
that the agency could sue for injunctions
to stop illegal workplace practices but
could not seek "victim- specific relief" like
back pay and damages.
In light of the decision last week, which is
expected to encourage more employers to
insist on arbitration agreements, the
question of the federal agency's role has
taken on added importance.
Copyright D The New York Times
Company.
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High Court will Revisit Roads' Affirmative Action;
Federal Program Constitutionality in Question
The Washington Times
Tuesday, March 27, 2001
Frank J. Murray
The Supreme Court agreed yesterday to
consider for the third time the
constitutionality of a federal road-
contracting program that gives
"economically and socially
disadvantaged" companies an edge in
winning jobs.
The Clinton administration revised the
affirmative-action program after the
Supreme Court declared it
unconstitutional in its 1995 Adarand
Constructors Inc. vs. Pena decision. On
the final full day of the administration
Clinton attorneys filed the last word in
Adarand III.
"The changes were clearly a ruse. It was
just simply an attempt to evade, and then
the Clinton people stonewalled and did
everything they could to keep the case
from being heard before summer," the
firm's attorney, William Perry Pendley of
Mountain States Legal Foundation, said
yesterday.
Last year the Supreme Court reversed a
lower court ruling that the case was moot
and reinstated the challenge to the law,
brought in 1990 by a Colorado firm
owned by a white family.
Yesterday the justices agreed to decide
this fall if Congress overreached its
constitutional powers in an effort "to
remedy the effects of racial
discrimination."
At the same time, the court yesterday
refused efforts by Fulton County, Ga., to
reinstate its local affirmative- action
program for awarding contracts. That left
in place a court ruling that the Georgia
county went too far in giving preferences
on the basis of race, ethnicity or sex.
The justices also agreed to decide next
term if it is constitutional to execute
mentally retarded murderers, accepting an
appeal brought by Ernest McCarver, who
got a reprieve March 1 until his case is
decided.
McCarver's attorneys noted that 13 death-
penalty states ban the execution of
mentally retarded prisoners and contend
this has created a "newly evolved
consensus" that should be applied
nationwide. Attorneys for the state of
North Carolina argue that he "had the
mental capacity to plan" the 1987 stabbing
and choking murder of Woodrow Hartley,
71, who worked with McCarver at a
cafeteria.
Regarding affirmative action, President
Bush has voiced opposition to "set-
asides" and quota programs, and his
Department of Transportation, headed by
Norman Y. Mineta, presumably could
settle the road-contracting case before it is
heard, which would automatically dismiss
the appeal. But Mr. Pendley said Attorney
General John Ashcroft has said he will
defend the Clinton-era regulations.
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"That's one of the things they're going to
have to grapple with. The U.S. 10th
Circuit Court of Appeals said the policy
already is changed," said another attorney
in the case, who declined to be quoted by
name about prospects the Bush
administration might intervene. "This
appeal is one of the first opportunities the
new administration has had to come to
grips with that."
The Adarand firm, which installs highway
guardrails, was unable to benefit from its
1995 Supreme Court victory even after it
got itself certified as an economically
disadvantaged firm.
Prospects of the Bush administration
intervening in the case appear dim,
according to Richmond lawyer Walter H.
Ryland, who filed separate briefs for the
Southeastern Legal Foundation and for
L.S. Lee Inc., a Pennsylvania guardrail
company that experienced the same
misfortune as Adarand did in Colorado.
"Historically, we have not seen
Republican administrations take
aggressive stances on affirmative action,"
Mr. Ryland said. He said GOP
administrations seem concerned with
controversies larger than the plight of
such "specialty contractors" who are most
affected because general contractors
comply with the law by sub-contracting
specialty work to minority-owned firms.
"The doggone case just doesn't seem to
want to go away," Mr. Ryland said. "I
hope that they can now find that the case
is in a posture that it can finally be
resolved."
Through several recent actions the high
court virtually outlawed any program that
goes beyond rectifying direct
discrimination against those involved, as
opposed to compensating women and
members of racial or ethnic groups for
past discrimination.
Mr. Pendley argued to the high court that
the government has not complied with the
court's requirement that remedial
programs be narrowly tailored to satisfy a
compelling government interest, a
doctrine called "strict scrutiny."
Originally, minority-owned companies
were presumed to be disadvantaged. The
program now requires sworn affidavits
and limits to $750,000 the net worth for
principals of any firm claiming the
preference. Under prodding by Adarand
Constructors, the government dropped its
presumption that white-owned firms
could not be similarly disadvantaged.
Copyright * 2001 News World
Communications , Inc.
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Bush Administration Supports an Affirmative Action Policy
New Yok Times
Saturday, August 11, 2001
Neil A. Lewis
In its first opportunity to take a stance
on affirmative action, the Bush
dministration asked the Supreme Court
tonight to uphold a Transportation
Department program intended to help
mnorty contractors.
In a brief filed with the court, the Justice
Department took the same position as
the Clinton administration had in the
case, which grew out of a challenge
brought years ago by a white-owned
construction company in Colorado
Springs.
The company, Adarand Constructors,
had submitted the low bid for a
transportation Department contract. But
the contract was awarded to a minority
contractor as part of the department's
"disadvantaged business enterprise"
program. Adarand sued, challenging the
policy.
The case has become somewhat
muddled since the Supreme Court first
ruled on it in 1995. Then, by a 5-to-4
vote, the justices set strict limits on
federal affirmative action programs,
ruling that such programs must be
narrowly tailored to meet a compelling
government interest.
The court found that the program
appeared flawed and should be reviewed
by lower courts to see whether using race
as a factor was justified in the award of
federal contracts.
Last September, the United States Court
of Appeals for the 10th Circuit, in
Denver, said the program met the "strict
scrutiny" test and was constitutional.
Moreover, since the Supreme Court's
first ruling, the program has been sharply
altered.
Under the revised program, even white-
owned small businesses can apply for
consideration as a disadvantaged
business. In addition, the new version of
the program no longer distributes
financial bonuses to contractors that use
minority-owned companies as
subcontractors.
In January, during its last day in office,
the Clinton administration argued that
the program now met the Supreme
Court's objections and that the court
should decline to reopen the matter.
When the justices voted in March to hear
a renewed appeal by Adarand, the Bush
administration faced its first significant
test on affirmative action.
In its brief filed tonight, the Justice
Department said that "the program is
not unconstitutional."
The 50-page brief cited the program
changes that let companies that are
economically disadvantaged apply for the
same preferences in receiving contracts.
The department argued that the program
was revised to minimize harm "to
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innocent third parties" and to create "as
level a playing field as possible."
But the Bush administration brief also
appears to accept an underlying tenet of
affirmative action: that some businesses
have suffered as a result of their minority
ownership.
During the presidential campaign,
George W. Bush said he opposed quotas
but spoke of a need for "affirmative
access," a stance that left his position on
the issue ambiguous.
The decision today by the Bush
administration was sharply criticized by
traditional opponents of affirmative
action. Linda Chavez, president of the
Center for Equal Opportunity, a
conservative group that studies
affirmative action programs, said she was
deeply disappointed.
"It's both bad policy and bad politics,"
said Ms. Chavez, who had been
President Bush's choice for secretary of
labor before she withdrew her
nomination. "First of all, it's never good
politics to betray your principles, and all
the people involved in making this policy
are people who have opposed racial
preferences."
Attorney General John Ashcroft was one
person Ms. Chavez cited. As a senator in
1998, Mr. Ashcroft voted against the
program.
But Mindy Tucker, the Justice
Department spokeswoman, said that
"this is John Ashcroft doing what he said
he would do in the confirmation
process," noting that Mr. Ashcroft had
pledged in his Senate testimony to
defend even those laws with which he
disagreed.
Georgina Verdugo, the executive
director of Americans for a Fair Chance,
a coalition of several major civil rights
groups that advocates affirmative action,
said she was pleasantly surprised by the
Bush administration's approach.
"It's the administration's first real
statement on affirmative action," she
said. "This particular program has been
through so many changes it is quite clear
that it now meets the Supreme Court's
requirements that it be better tailored as
a remedy."
The case is to be heard by the Supreme
Court sometime this fall.
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